Evolution, Morality and Politics
Evolution, Morality and Politics
Associação Brasileira de Estudos de Ética Integrada – ABEEI
Quarto encontro
Os desajustes evolutivos nas democracias de massa
Por que nossos vieses psicológicos se tornaram um problema
Prof. Dr. Walter Valdevino (UFRRJ)
05/01/2023 – 18h:30
Ao Vivo no Youtube
https://www.youtube.com/@abeeievolutiva
1º Seminário dos Grupos de Pesquisa do PPGFil-UFRRJ | 25 a 28 de abril de 2022
https://cursos.ufrrj.br/posgraduacao/ppgfil/1o-seminario-dos-grupos-de-pesquisa
O evento será exclusivamente online, através da plataforma Google Meet.
Prazo final para inscrição de ouvintes: 23 de abril de 2022, sábado, 23:59.
A inscrição para ouvintes é gratuita e deverá ser feita através de Formulário Google.
O link de acesso ao Google Meet será enviado, no dia 24 de abril de 2022, para o e-mail preenchido no formulário de inscrição.
O certificado de participação para os presentes também será enviado através do e-mail preenchido no formulário de inscrição.
Quarta-feira, 27 de abril de 2022
Grupo de Pesquisa Evolução, moralidade e política
13:30 – Walter Valdevino Oliveira Silva (PPGFil-UFRRJ): Teoria da Evolução como base para a moralidade e a política
14:00 – Iago Pereira da Silva (PPGFil-UFRRJ): O problema da base biológica para a ética normativa
14:30 – Maíra Bittencourt (Mestre em Filosofia – Unicamp): Bayesianismo e Filosofia da Ciência
15:00 – Miécimo Ribeiro Moreira Júnior (PPGLM-UFRJ): Teogonia Política
15:30 – Paulo Marcos da Silva (Biologia – Freie Universität Berlin): Evolução da genitália humana comparada com a de primatas
16:00 – Matheus Adriano Ferreira Coelho (Biologia-UFRJ): As quatro questões de Tinbergen: como a biologia pode nortear as ciências humanas
“E se tudo o que você aprendeu sobre a história humana estiver errado?
Em The Dawn of Everything, o antropólogo David Graeber e o arqueólogo David Wengrow pretendem reescrever a história de nosso passado compartilhado – e futuro.
Por Jennifer Schuessler
31 de outubro de 2021
https: // www.nytimes.com/2021/10/31/arts/dawn-of-everything-graeber-wengrow.html
Os best-sellers de Big History de Harari, Diamond e outros têm suas diferenças. Mas eles se baseiam, argumentam Graeber e Wengrow, em uma narrativa semelhante de progresso linear (ou, dependendo do seu ponto de vista, declínio).
De acordo com essa história, nos primeiros 300.000 anos ou mais após o aparecimento do Homo sapiens, praticamente nada aconteceu. Em todos os lugares, as pessoas viviam em pequenos grupos igualitários de caçadores-coletores, até a repentina invenção da agricultura por volta de 9.000 a.C. deu origem a sociedades e estados sedentários baseados na desigualdade, hierarquia e burocracia.
Mas tudo isso, Graeber e Wengrow argumentam, está errado. Recentes descobertas arqueológicas, eles escrevem, mostram que os primeiros humanos, longe de serem autômatos movendo-se cegamente em uma etapa de bloqueio evolucionária em resposta a pressões materiais, conscientemente experimentaram com “um desfile de carnaval de formas políticas”.
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“Somos todos projetos de autocriação coletiva”, escrevem eles. “E se, em vez de contar a história de como nossa sociedade caiu de algum estado idílico de igualdade, perguntarmos como viemos ficar presos em grilhões conceituais tão rígidos que não podemos mais imaginar a possibilidade de nos reinventarmos?”
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The Dawn of Everything inclui discussões sobre sepultamentos principescos na Europa durante a idade do gelo, contrastes de atitudes em relação à escravidão entre as sociedades indígenas do norte da Califórnia e do noroeste do Pacífico, as implicações políticas da terra seca versus a agricultura no leito dos rios e a complexidade da pré-agricultura de assentamentos no Japão, entre muitos, muitos outros assuntos.
Mas a gama impressionante de referências levanta uma questão: quem está qualificado para julgar se isso é verdade?
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James C. Scott, um eminente cientista político de Yale, cujo livro de 2017 Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States também variou vários campos para desafiar a narrativa padrão, disse que alguns dos argumentos de Graeber e Wengrow, como os seus, iriam inevitavelmente, ser “jogados fora” quando outros estudiosos se envolverem com eles.
Mas ele disse que os dois homens deram um “golpe fatal” à ideia já enfraquecida de que se estabelecer em estados agrícolas era o que os humanos “estavam esperando para fazer o tempo todo”.
Mas a parte mais impressionante de The Dawn of Everything, disse Scott, é um capítulo inicial sobre o que os autores chamam de “crítica indígena”. O Iluminismo europeu, eles argumentam, em vez de ser um presente de sabedoria concedido ao resto do mundo, surgiu de um diálogo com os povos indígenas do Novo Mundo, cujas avaliações incisivas das deficiências da sociedade europeia influenciaram as ideias emergentes de liberdade.” [Google Tradutor]
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“What if Everything You Learned About Human History Is Wrong?
In “The Dawn of Everything,” the anthropologist David Graeber and the archaeologist David Wengrow aim to rewrite the story of our shared past — and future.
By Jennifer Schuessler
Oct. 31, 2021
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/31/arts/dawn-of-everything-graeber-wengrow.html
The Big History best-sellers by Harari, Diamond and others have their differences. But they rest, Graeber and Wengrow argue, on a similar narrative of linear progress (or, depending on your point of view, decline).
According to this story, for the first 300,000 years or so after Homo sapiens appeared, pretty much nothing happened. People everywhere lived in small, egalitarian hunter-gatherer groups, until the sudden invention of agriculture around 9,000 B.C. gave rise to sedentary societies and states based on inequality, hierarchy and bureaucracy.
But all of this, Graeber and Wengrow argue, is wrong. Recent archaeological discoveries, they write, show that early humans, far from being automatons blindly moving in evolutionary lock step in response to material pressures, self-consciously experimented with “a carnival parade of political forms.”
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“We are all projects of collective self-creation,” they write. “What if, instead of telling the story about how our society fell from some idyllic state of equality, we ask how we came to be trapped in such tight conceptual shackles that we can no longer even imagine the possibility of reinventing ourselves?”
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“The Dawn of Everything” includes discussions of princely burials in Europe during the ice age, contrasting attitudes toward slavery among the Indigenous societies of Northern California and the Pacific Northwest, the political implications of dry-land versus riverbed farming, and the complexity of preagricultural settlements in Japan, among many, many other subjects.
But the dazzling range of references raises a question: Who is qualified to judge whether it’s true?
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James C. Scott, an eminent political scientist at Yale whose 2017 book “Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States” also ranged across fields to challenge the standard narrative, said some of Graeber and Wengrow’s arguments, like his own, would inevitably be “thrown out” as other scholars engaged with them.
But he said the two men had delivered a “fatal blow” to the already-weakened idea that settling down in agricultural states was what humans “had been waiting to do all along.”
But the most striking part of “The Dawn of Everything,” Scott said, is an early chapter on what the authors call the “Indigenous critique.” The European Enlightenment, they argue, rather than being a gift of wisdom bestowed on the rest of the world, grew out of a dialogue with Indigenous people of the New World, whose trenchant assessments of the shortcomings of European society influenced emerging ideas of freedom.”
“A neurocognitive model of ideological thinking” – Leor Zmigrod
Politics and the Life Sciences
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 August 2021
Leor Zmigrod
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Leor Zmigrod – Um modelo neurocognitivo de pensamento ideológico
Publicado online pela Cambridge University Press: 02 de agosto de 2021
Leor Zmigrod
Resumo
O comportamento ideológico tem sido tradicionalmente visto como um produto de forças sociais. No entanto, uma ciência emergente sugere que as visões de mundo ideológicas também podem ser entendidas em termos de princípios neurais e cognitivos. O artigo propõe um modelo neurocognitivo de pensamento ideológico, argumentando que as visões de mundo ideológicas podem ser manifestações dos sistemas perceptuais e cognitivos dos indivíduos. Este modelo faz duas afirmações. Em primeiro lugar, existem antecedentes neurocognitivos para o pensamento ideológico: as disposições neurocognitivas de baixo nível do cérebro influenciam sua receptividade às doutrinas ideológicas. Em segundo lugar, existem consequências neurocognitivas para o engajamento ideológico: forte exposição e adesão a doutrinas ideológicas podem moldar sistemas perceptuais e cognitivos. Este artigo detalha o modelo neurocognitivo do pensamento ideológico e sintetiza as evidências empíricas que sustentam suas afirmações. O modelo postula que existem processos bidirecionais entre o cérebro e o ambiente ideológico e, portanto, pode abordar os papéis dos fatores situacionais e motivacionais na ação motivada ideologicamente. Este esforço destaca que uma abordagem neurocognitiva interdisciplinar para ideologias pode facilitar relatos biologicamente informados do cérebro ideológico e, assim, revelar quem é mais suscetível a ideologias extremistas e autoritárias. Ao investigar as relações entre os processos perceptivos de baixo nível e as atitudes ideológicas de alto nível, podemos desenvolver uma compreensão melhor de nossa história coletiva, bem como dos mecanismos que podem estruturar nosso futuro político.
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… é pertinente usar as ferramentas da ciência moderna para perguntar: Existe uma relação entre as visões de mundo ideológicas e os mecanismos fundamentais de pensamento e raciocínio? E, em caso afirmativo, quão profundamente o efeito das ideologias penetra em nossos processos cognitivos?
A proposta detalhada aqui argumenta que há uma relação subjacente entre ideologias de alto nível e percepção e cognição de baixo nível que pode ser mais profunda e complexa do que Arendt imaginou. A proposta postula que as ideologias privadas dos indivíduos são manifestações de suas tendências perceptivas e cognitivas, influenciadas por experiências crônicas e temporárias. Além disso, sugere que o forte envolvimento com ideologias vigorosas pode, subsequentemente, moldar o funcionamento perceptivo e cognitivo. É importante ressaltar que a percepção e a cognição aqui são operacionalizadas em termos da literatura neuropsicológica – isto é, em termos da maneira como os cérebros processam e avaliam os estímulos. É, portanto, uma estrutura fundamentalmente neurocognitiva de ideologias, explorando como nossa compreensão do cérebro pode iluminar questões como: como as ideologias são internalizadas pelas mentes dos adeptos? Que fatores aumentam ou diminuem a suscetibilidade de um indivíduo ao pensamento ideológico? O forte envolvimento com uma ideologia molda o funcionamento cognitivo e neural do indivíduo?
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O modelo neurocognitivo faz duas afirmações essenciais. Primeiro, ele argumenta que existem antecedentes neurocognitivos para o pensamento ideológico: as disposições neurocognitivas do cérebro moldam sua receptividade às doutrinas ideológicas. Em segundo lugar, pode haver consequências neurocognitivas para o engajamento ideológico: a exposição e a adesão a doutrinas ideológicas podem moldar os sistemas perceptuais e cognitivos.
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Isso estende as afirmações feitas por filósofos políticos como Arendt a um novo território: as ideologias podem ter um impacto profundo nas mentes dos adeptos ao moldar seu funcionamento neural e cognitivo.
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Em contraste com os relatos situacionais e motivacionais, o modelo neurocognitivo argumenta que as visões de mundo ideológicas refletem tendências cognitivas e perceptivas e, por sua vez, as ideologias podem influenciar os processos neurocognitivos de baixo nível (Figura 2C). Portanto, considera o pensamento ideológico como negociado neurocognitivamente, ao invés do produto de situações autoritárias ou necessidades psicológicas. No entanto, o modelo neurocognitivo ainda abre espaço para o efeito de situações e motivações. Situações que provocam estresse ou forte pressão social podem amplificar processos neurocognitivos (por exemplo, Lupien et al., 2007; Schoofs et al., 2008) que orientam os indivíduos – em diferentes graus – a se comportar de maneiras ideológicas. Por exemplo, uma situação estressante pode prejudicar a flexibilidade cognitiva e a função executiva (Alexander et al., 2007; Plessow et al., 2011; Schoofs et al., 2008) e, assim, produzir um comportamento ideologicamente rígido e tornar o indivíduo receptivo à propaganda.
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O modelo neurocognitivo também pode informar o trabalho sobre a herdabilidade genética de crenças ideológicas (Hatemi et al., 2013; Hatemi et al., 2014; Israel et al., 2015) postulando mecanismos específicos através dos quais variações genéticas contribuem para diferenças neurocognitivas e, portanto, atitudes ideológicas. Portanto, é capaz de postular teorias mecanicistas sobre como os processos biológicos moldam as visões de mundo ideológicas. Além disso, os modelos situacionais e motivacionais assumem efeitos unilaterais: o modelo situacional vê as situações como se impondo ao indivíduo (Figura 2A), e o modelo motivacional vê as necessidades do indivíduo como um estímulo à expressão do pensamento ideológico (Figura 2B). Em contraste, o modelo neurocognitivo postula explicitamente que há processos bidirecionais entre o ambiente ideológico e o cérebro (Figura 2C).
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Suporte empírico para o modelo neurocognitivo
As evidências dos antecedentes neurocognitivos e das consequências das ideologias podem ser encontradas nos campos florescentes da neurociência política e da psicologia social experimental. Um trabalho recente revelou que os processos de tomada de decisão cognitivos e perceptivos ideologicamente neutros estão relacionados a convicções e crenças ideológicas de nível superior (Rollwage et al., 2018; Rollwage et al., 2019; Zmigrod et al., 2018; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins 2019; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, Zmigrod, & Robbins 2019; Zmigrod, Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins 2019; Zmigrod, 2020b). Três traços cognitivos que recentemente mostraram conferir suscetibilidade ao pensamento ideológico são particularmente notáveis: (1) inflexibilidade cognitiva, (2) consciência metacognitiva prejudicada e (3) processamento de acumulação de evidência perceptual mais lento.
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A rigidez com que os indivíduos percebem e processam os estímulos geralmente estava ligada à rigidez de suas crenças ideológicas. Consequentemente, essas descobertas demonstram que as disposições nas tendências implícitas de processamento de informações podem estar ligadas a visões de mundo ideológicas explícitas de alto nível.
Em segundo lugar, pesquisas cognitivas recentes ilustraram uma relação entre metacognição prejudicada – a consciência de nossos processos cognitivos – e dogmatismo ideológico tanto na esquerda quanto na direita (Rollwage et al., 2018). Aqui, também, os pesquisadores empregaram paradigmas neuropsicológicos e modelos computacionais para revelar diferenças entre indivíduos que eram ideologicamente moderados versus extremos. Indivíduos que eram ideologicamente extremos foram caracterizados por metacognição prejudicada, sugerindo que a capacidade dos indivíduos de estar cientes e regular seu funcionamento cognitivo pode conferir suscetibilidade a ideologias internalizantes. Há um suporte empírico crescente para a ideia de que a resistência às evidências na esfera sociopolítica pode, portanto, emergir de um comprometimento neurocognitivo em processos metacognitivos (Fischer et al., 2019; Heyes et al., 2020; Kleitman et al., 2019; Morris et al., 2019; Morris et al., 2019; al., 2019; Rollwage et al., 2019; Sinclair et al., 2019).
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De fato, pesquisas da ciência cognitiva da religião (Barrett, 2000; Bering, 2006; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Sosis & Alcorta, 2003) ilustraram as consequências neurocognitivas do engajamento ideológico. A religião é um candidato ideológico útil devido à intensidade de seus rituais e à variabilidade nas práticas religiosas. Esta linha de trabalho demonstrou que a adesão repetitiva às práticas religiosas parece moldar a percepção visual, a neurofisiologia e as políticas cognitivas de metacontrole. Por exemplo, a percepção visual hierárquica de ateus mostrou ser diferente da dos neocalvinistas (Colzato et al., 2008; Colzato, van Beest, et al., 2010), católicos romanos italianos (Colzato, van Beest, 2010) , Judeus ortodoxos (Colzato, van Beest, 2010a) e budistas zen taiwaneses (Colzato, Hommel, et al, 2010).
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Além disso, os neurocientistas postularam que a religião pode servir como um antídoto neural para a ansiedade e a incerteza (Inzlicht et al., 2011). Correspondentemente, foi demonstrado que invocar conceitos religiosos pode alterar o monitoramento neurofisiológico de erros de participantes religiosos. Especificamente, entre os crentes religiosos, contemplar pensamentos religiosos (como o amor de Deus) pode diminuir a negatividade relacionada ao erro, um sinal neural que emerge do córtex cingulado anterior que está implicado no monitoramento do desempenho e na resposta afetiva aos erros (Good et al., 2015) Além disso, maior zelo religioso – uma forma fanática de crença – foi associado a menor negatividade relacionada ao erro ao completar uma tarefa de Stroop perceptual (Inzlicht et al., 2009), corroborando a ideia de que a religião pode atuar como um paliativo para reduzir a ansiedade por causa de suas propriedades epistêmicas gerais e de criação de significado (Inzlicht et al., 2011). É importante qualificar esses resultados e abordar a bidirecionalidade potencial desses efeitos; a exposição religiosa pode moldar a neurocognição dos indivíduos e, ao mesmo tempo, as predisposições neurocognitivas podem influenciar o tipo e o nível de zelo com que os indivíduos aderem à ideologia religiosa. Consequentemente, embora a religião ofereça um valioso caso de teste para o impacto das ideologias no cérebro, os processos de auto-seleção ideológica também devem ser considerados.
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Um modelo neurocognitivo de pensamentos e ações motivados ideologicamente, portanto, tem o poder de ilustrar que as posições ideológicas têm bases neurobiológicas e sintetizar a gama de pesquisas neurocientíficas e cognitivas recentes sob teorias e hipóteses testáveis (Alford et al., 2005; Batrićević & Littvay, 2017; Fowler et al., 2008; Hatemi & McDermott, 2012a, 2012b; Ksiazkiewicz & Krueger, 2017; Leong et al., 2020; Nam et al., 2017; Zmigrod & Tsakiris, 2021). O modelo é sensível às relações causais, ciente das ligações bidirecionais entre ambientes e processos mentais, e capaz de dar uma linguagem de mediação (Ksiazkiewicz et al., 2016; Oskarsson et al., 2015) e mecanismos moderadores para a pesquisa complexa sobre a genética das orientações ideológicas (por exemplo, Dawes & Weinschenk, 2020; Hatemi et al., 2014; Twito & Knafo-Noam, 2020). De que forma os genes que moldam a cognição e a percepção têm efeitos a jusante no comportamento ideológico? Os genes que codificam a reatividade ambiental tornam um indivíduo particularmente suscetível a movimentos ideológicos convincentes? Romper a hereditariedade da ideologia política – e avaliar outros aspectos da ideologia, como dogmatismo, extremismo e hostilidade interpessoal – permitirá uma biologia da ideologia mais informativa. Notavelmente, pesquisas no campo da biopolítica ilustraram que atribuir processos ideológicos à biologia pode ajudar a promover a tolerância política (Baker & Haas, 2020; no entanto, ver Suhay et al., 2017); conduzir essa ciência pode, portanto, ter repercussões positivas no mundo mais amplo.
A pesquisa de ponta na intersecção das ciências políticas e biológicas está agora nos permitindo fazer novas perguntas. Quais fatores neurobiológicos determinam a receptividade ou resistência de um indivíduo aos sistemas ideológicos? Quais são as vantagens e perigos neurocognitivos de um forte engajamento com ideologias? E quando é que a missão da ideologia importa? Essas questões socialmente pertinentes têm o poder de aumentar nossa compreensão tanto da política quanto do cérebro, e de elucidar a natureza do “cérebro ideológico”. Uma abordagem neurocognitiva das ideologias, portanto, nos permitirá explorar paradoxos atemporais, bem como as origens das questões sociais contemporâneas – abrindo caminho para uma compreensão informada e informativa dos papéis da biologia e da experiência na formação das crenças ideológicas privadas dos cidadãos.” [Google Tradutor]
“Will science survive politics?
Whether something is politically convenient or not doesn’t affect whether it’s true
By Tom Chivers
May 11, 2021
https://unherd.com/2021/05/will-science-survive-politics/
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No one really cares about creationists any more. Instead, the row is over whether Darwin – and his theory, or its implications – is racist, or sexist. And the people passionately defending him are often right-wingers, while his critics are on the Left.
The latest incarnation is a by-the-numbers fighting-the-culture-war piece in the Telegraph about a guide to “Applying a decolonial framework to teaching and research in ecology and evolution” published by some plant scientists in the University of Sheffield. In the guide, science lecturers are told to contextualise Darwin by making it clear how his worldview was shaped by colonialism and racism.
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I also rather wish that the Sheffield academics had mentioned whether or not they think Darwin’s theory of natural selection is true or not. There’s an awful lot of talk about power imbalances, Eurocentric viewpoints, and the legacy of colonialism, and how science “cannot be objective and apolitical” – but regardless of whether or not Darwin was racist, was he right? Maybe that’s taken for granted.
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The sad, forgotten creationists aside, most of us gladly accept that dragonflies’ wings and wombats’ toenails or whatever have evolved; that those ancestors which had versions of those organs more suited to their environment tended to have more offspring.
But when Darwin’s idea gets applied to behaviour, it becomes more controversial. The field of science that tries to do this is called sociobiology; it was controversial enough when it arose in the Seventies, pioneered by EO Wilson. It caused a furore – protesters poured water over Wilson’s head during a conference talk, chanting “Racist Wilson, you can’t hide, we charge you with genocide.” Wilson’s work was mainly about ants.
When Darwinian ideas are applied to the human brain, and human behaviour, it is called evolutionary psychology, and that is more controversial still.
Which, on the face of it, is strange. Evolutionary psychology is, at its heart, the idea that the brain (and therefore the mind, and human behaviour and psychology in general) is the product of evolution, just like every other animal organ. As Richard Dawkins wrote in the 2005 foreword to The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, that is so obviously true as to be almost not worth saying: “The central claim [of evolutionary psychology] is not an extraordinary one,” he wrote. “It amounts to the exceedingly modest claim that minds are on the same footing as bodies where Darwinian natural selection is concerned. Given that feet, livers, ears, wings, shells, eyes, crests, ligaments, antennae, hearts and feathers are shaped by natural selection … why on earth should the same not be true of brains[?]”
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The idea that the mind is evolved goes back to Darwin himself, but it was Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, a wife-and-husband team of academics, who really developed the field in The Adapted Mind, a book of essays they edited in 1992.
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Charles Darwin, the historical figure, is interesting to study, and it’s worth remembering that he was a man of his time. But Darwinism, the great insight of evolution by natural selection, is separate. It is true (or false) regardless of Darwin’s own views, and so are the many insights which have followed it. We can go back and forth over whether he was a racist, but the more interesting question is: was he right?”
“The misinformation virus
Lies and distortions don’t just afflict the ignorant. The more you know, the more vulnerable you can be to infection
Elitsa Dermendzhiyska
is a science writer and social entrepreneur working at the intersection of technology, research and mental health. She is the editor of the mental health anthology What Doesn’t Kill You: 15 Stories of Survival (2020). She lives in London.
16 April 2021
https://aeon.co/essays/why-humans-find-it-so-hard-to-let-go-of-false-beliefs
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What’s different today is the speed, scope and scale of misinformation, enabled by technology. Online media has given voice to previously marginalised groups, including peddlers of untruth, and has supercharged the tools of deception at their disposal. The transmission of falsehoods now spans a viral cycle in which AI, professional trolls and our own content-sharing activities help to proliferate and amplify misleading claims. These new developments have come on the heels of rising inequality, falling civic engagement and fraying social cohesion – trends that render us more susceptible to demagoguery. Just as alarming, a growing body of research over the past decade is casting doubt on our ability – even our willingness – to resist misinformation in the face of corrective evidence.
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Yet no matter how clear the correction, typically more than half of subjects’ references to the original misinformation persist. What’s remarkable is that people appear to cling to the falsehood while knowing it to be false. This suggests that, even if successfully debunked, myths can still creep into our judgments and colour our decisions – an outcome referred to in the literature as ‘the continued influence effect’.
Why does this happen? According to Jason Reifler, professor of political science at the University of Exeter, we tend to take incoming information at face value, ‘because the existence of human society is predicated on the ability of people to interact and [on] expectations of good faith.’ Moreover, myths can take on subtle, crafty forms that feign legitimacy, making them hard to expose without careful analysis or fact checks. This means that those of us too dazed by the job of living to exert an extra mental effort can easily succumb to deception. And once a falsehood has slipped in and become encoded in memory – even weakly – it can prove remarkably sticky and resistant to correction.
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Another reason why misinformation resists correction is repetition. Once something gets repeated often enough – sensational claims on social media; urban legends passed from one bored timewaster to another – it can trick us into taking it as true merely because of its familiarity. The illusory truth effect, as it’s known, suggests that the easier to process and more familiar something is, the more likely we are to believe it. Which is exactly what repeating a misleading claim does – getting it to go down smooth by strengthening the neural pathways linked to it.
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In recent years, as misinformation has wormed its way into large swathes of society, scientists have been looking for the most effective methods to counter it. Recently, Lewandowsky spearheaded The Debunking Handbook 2020, an online collection of best practice by 22 of the most active researchers in the field. The contributors nominated more than 50 relevant findings and more than 30 practical recommendations, rating them on their importance and the strength of the available evidence. To successfully debunk a myth, the authors conclude, it helps to provide an alternative causal explanation to fill the mental gap that retracting the myth could leave. Counterarguments work too, as they point out the inconsistencies contained in the myth, allowing people to resolve the clash between the true and the false statement. Another strategy is to evoke suspicion about the source of the misinformation. For example, you might be more critical of government officials who reject human-caused global warming if you suspect vested business interests behind the denialist claims.
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John Cook, a climate change communication researcher at George Mason University in Virginia, told me: ‘I could develop the perfect message that debunks the myth completely. And, even if I could get that message to the right person, what happens if they just go home and turn on Fox News and get five hours of misinformation thrown at them? That particular message will be wiped out.’
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To fully grasp the pernicious nature of the misinformation virus, we need to reconsider the innocence of the host. It’s easy to see ourselves as victims of deception by malicious actors. It’s also tempting to think of being misinformed as something that happens to other people – some unnamed masses, easily swayed by demagoguery and scandal. ‘The problem is that people are sheep,’ one friend said to me. I’ve heard this sentiment echoed time and again by others, the implication always being that they and I were not like those other, misinformed people. No: we were educated, had been taught to think, immune to dupery. But, as it turns out, misinformation doesn’t prey only on the ignorant: sometimes, those who seem least vulnerable to the virus can prove its keenest hosts, and even handmaidens.
(…)
In the 2010 study, published in Nature in 2012, Kahan and his collaborators measured subjects’ science literacy and numeracy, and plotted those against the participants’ perceived risk of global warming. If the science comprehension thesis was right, then the more knowledgeable the subjects, the more they’d converge towards the scientific consensus. Surprisingly, however, the data revealed that those who scored high on hierarchy and individualism – the hallmark values of a conservative outlook – exhibited the opposite pattern: as their science literacy and numeracy increased, their concern for climate change actually declined. What explains this seeming paradox?
Kahan argues that rather than being a simple matter of intelligence or critical thinking, the question of global warming triggers deeply held personal beliefs. In a way, asking for people’s take on climate change is also to ask them who they are and what they value. For conservatives to accept the risk of global warming means to also accept the need for drastic cuts to carbon emissions – an idea utterly at odds with the hierarchical, individualistic values at the core of their identity, which, by rejecting climate change, they seek to protect. Kahan found similar polarisation over social issues that impinge on identity, such as gun control, nuclear energy and fracking, but not over more identity-neutral subjects such as GMO foods and artificial sweeteners. In cases where identity-protective motivations play a key role, people tend to seek and process information in biased ways that conform to their prior beliefs. They might pay attention only to sources they agree with and ignore divergent views. Or they might believe congruent claims without a moment’s thought, but spare no effort finding holes in incongruent statements: the brightest climate-change deniers were simply better than their peers at counter-arguing evidence they didn’t like.
This hints at a vexing conclusion: that the most knowledgeable among us can be more, not less, susceptible to misinformation if it feeds into cherished beliefs and identities. And though most available research points to a conservative bias, liberals are by no means immune.
In a 2003 study, Geoffrey Cohen, then a professor of psychology at Yale, now at Stanford University, asked subjects to evaluate a government-funded job-training programme to help the poor. All subjects were liberal, so naturally the vast majority (76 per cent) favoured the policy. However, if subjects were told that Democrats didn’t support the programme, the results completely reversed: this time, 71 per cent opposed it. Cohen replicated this outcome in a series of influential studies, with both liberal and conservative participants. He showed that subjects would support policies that strongly contradict their own political beliefs if they think that others like them supported those policies. Despite the social influence, obvious to an outsider, participants remained blind to it, and attributed their preferences to objective criteria and personal ideology. This would come as no surprise to social psychologists, who have long attested to the power of the group over the individual, yet most of us would doubtless flinch at the whiff of conformity and the suggestion that our thoughts and actions might not be entirely our own.
For Kahan, though, conformity to group beliefs makes sense. Since each individual has only negligible impact on collective decisions, it’s sensible to focus on optimising one’s social ties instead. Belonging to a community is, after all, a vital source of self-worth, not to mention health, even survival. Socially rejected or isolated people face heightened risks of many diseases as well as early death. Seen from this perspective, then, the impulse to fit our beliefs and behaviours to those of our social groups, even when they clash with our own, is, Kahan argues, ‘exceedingly rational’. Ironically, however, rational individual choices can have irrational collective consequences. As tribal attachments prevail, emotions trump evidence, and the ensuing disagreement chokes off action on important social issues.
(…)
I’ve wondered recently if, like school violence, misinformation is becoming part of the culture, if it persists because some of us actively partake in it, and some merely stand by and allow it to continue. If that’s the case, then perhaps we ought to worry less about fixing people’s false beliefs and focus more on shifting those social norms that make it OK to create, spread, share and tolerate misinformation. Paluck shows one way to do this in practice – highly visible individual action reaching critical mass; another way could entail tighter regulation of social media platforms. And our own actions matter, too. As the Scottish biologist D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson said in 1917, ‘everything is what it is because it got that way’. We are, each and every one of us, precariously perched between our complicity in the world as it is and our capacity to make it what it can be.”
“Evolutionary Mismatch, Partisan Politics, and Climate Change: A Tragedy in Three Acts
By Helen Camakaris
Helen gained her Ph.D. in 1975 and worked as a Senior Research Scientist in the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Melbourne, Australia. She studied the regulation of gene expression in bacteria and archaebacteria, which aligned with her interest in evolution. She retired in 2008 to pursue her interest in the nexus between evolutionary psychology, sustainability, and climate change, and has been studying and publishing articles in this area for the past ten years. Her articles have appeared in Meanjin Quarterly, The Conversation, Cosmos Magazine, New Internationalist, and Kosmos Magazine, and can be found online under Notes on her Facebook Page.
Twitter: @helenmcama
Facebook Page: ‘The Climate Conundrum, with Helen Camakaris’ at https://www.facebook.com/h.camakaris/
This View of Life
(…)
During the Pleistocene, our brains were upgraded by changes that enabled our ancestors to leave more descendants, largely as a result of expansion in the cerebral neo-cortex. Evolution is glacially slow and our rise is recent, so our psychology suffers from evolutionary ‘mismatch,’5 whereby the shadows of the past still influence our behavior.6
(…)
Like biological evolution, cultural evolution builds upon whatever has preceded it and is also subject to a form of ‘natural selection,’8 whereby some ‘memes’ or ideas persist and spread.9 Cultural evolution and natural selection acted together as a ratchet, culminating in vastly increased intelligence and creativity.5
Altruism too, was a product of natural selection involving language and social intelligence, its selection enhanced by multilevel selection, with competition at the level of groups or tribes.10 Altruism, however, is generally circumscribed by an obsession with ‘fairness’ and discrimination between ‘them’ and ‘us’, presenting problems when we must plan for the distant future, or cooperate beyond the local tribe.
So although we may now be extraordinarily intelligent, we are not always rational, simply as a result of our evolutionary journey.11 Our decision-making often involves emotional reasoning, using ‘gut instinct’, which we then justify by rational thought.12 Our cognition is also subject to a myriad of biases affecting our judgment.13 For example, we tend to discount the future, follow our in-group, and collect evidence to justify our pre-existing opinions. We are further limited by our poor comprehension of large numbers and exponential growth, as became obvious during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, even intelligence has been a double-edged sword, promoting the transition from hunter-gatherer to improviser, and the ‘progress’ that followed. Technological advances like agriculture around 10,000 years ago made surpluses possible; people began to live in towns and cities, to specialize, trade with other groups, and have larger families. Whilst this satisfied the evolutionary imperative of increasing population, it heralded poorer diets, more disease, and greater social stratification.”
“Can the brain resist the group opinion?
by National Research University Higher School of Economics
https://medicalxpress.com/news/2021-02-brain-resist-group-opinion.html
Scientists at HSE University have learned that disagreeing with the opinion of other people leaves a ‘trace’ in brain activity, which allows the brain to later adjust its opinion in favor of the majority-held point of view. The article was published in Scientific Reports.
We often change our beliefs under the influence of others. This social behavior is called conformity and explains various components of our behavior, from voting at elections to fashion trends among teenagers.
Brain research has recently been well informed about short-term effects of social influence on decision making. If our choice coincides with the point of view of the people who are important to us, this decision is reinforced in the brain’s pleasure centers involved in the larger dopaminergic system responsible for learning, motor activity and many other functions. Conversely, in instances of disagreement with others, the brain signals that a ‘mistake’ has been made and triggers conformity.
(…)
Thus, the opinions of others not only influence our behavior, but also cause long-term changes in the way our brains work. Apparently, the brain not only quickly adjusts to the opinions of others, but also begins to perceive information through the eyes of the majority in order to avoid social conflicts in the future.
“Our study shows the dramatic influence of others’s opinion on how we perceive information,” says HSE University Professor Vasily Klucharev, one of the authors of the study. “We live in social groups and automatically adjust our opinions to that of the majority, and the opinion of our peers can change the way our brain processes information for a relatively long time.”
“It was very interesting to use modern methods of neuro-mapping and to see traces of past conflicts with the opinion of the group in the brain’s activity,” adds Aleksei Gorin, a Ph.D. student at HSE University. “The brain absorbs the opinion of others like a sponge and adjusts its functions to the opinion of its social group.”
***
MEG signatures of long-term effects of agreement and disagreement with the majority
A. Gorin, V. Klucharev, A. Ossadtchi, I. Zubarev, V. Moiseeva & A. Shestakova
Scientific Reports volume 11, Article number: 3297 (2021)
Published: 08 February 2021
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-82670-x
Abstract
People often change their beliefs by succumbing to an opinion of others. Such changes are often referred to as effects of social influence. While some previous studies have focused on the reinforcement learning mechanisms of social influence or on its internalization, others have reported evidence of changes in sensory processing evoked by social influence of peer groups. In this study, we used magnetoencephalographic (MEG) source imaging to further investigate the long-term effects of agreement and disagreement with the peer group. The study was composed of two sessions. During the first session, participants rated the trustworthiness of faces and subsequently learned group rating of each face. In the first session, a neural marker of an immediate mismatch between individual and group opinions was found in the posterior cingulate cortex, an area involved in conflict-monitoring and reinforcement learning. To identify the neural correlates of the long-lasting effect of the group opinion, we analysed MEG activity while participants rated faces during the second session. We found MEG traces of past disagreement or agreement with the peers at the parietal cortices 230 ms after the face onset. The neural activity of the superior parietal lobule, intraparietal sulcus, and precuneus was significantly stronger when the participant’s rating had previously differed from the ratings of the peers. The early MEG correlates of disagreement with the majority were followed by activity in the orbitofrontal cortex 320 ms after the face onset. Altogether, the results reveal the temporal dynamics of the neural mechanism of long-term effects of disagreement with the peer group: early signatures of modified face processing were followed by later markers of long-term social influence on the valuation process at the ventromedial prefrontal cortex.”
“Learning from Evolution about Free Speech
By David Sloan Wilson
January 11, 2021
https://thisviewoflife.com/learning-from-evolution-about-free-speech/
(…)
The world is in turmoil over the incendiary language of a US president, the invasion of the US Capitol Building incited by his speech, and the silencing of the president by giant tech firms. Commentators fall back on the US Constitution, especially the First Amendment, to make sense of it all—as if the wisdom of the founders could somehow anticipate the Internet Age. To truly make sense of it all, we need to go back—way back—to the genetic evolution of our species at the scale of small groups.
Humans are masters of social regulation at the scale of small groups. Alexis d’Toqueville, the acute observer of American democracy in the 1830’s, got it right when he wrote that “the village or township is the only association which is so perfectly natural that wherever a number of men are collected it seems to constitute itself.”
Toqueville’s use of the word “natural” was more apropos than he could have known, writing decades before Darwin’s theory of evolution. Today we know that our ability to cooperate in small groups is a product of genetic evolution. Even though we share 99% of our genes with chimpanzees, there is a night-and-day difference in our cooperativeness. According to Harvard anthropologist Richard Wrangham in his book The Goodness Paradox (1), naked aggression is over 100 times more frequent in a chimpanzee community than a small-scale human community. Even cooperation in chimpanzees typically takes the form of small alliances competing against other alliances within a given community. The main form of community-wide cooperation is aggression toward other communities.
(…)
Likewise, small-scale human societies are not just communitarian but also stubbornly individualistic. Since the great danger is to be pushed around, all members assert their right as a moral equal so that decision-making becomes a collective enterprise. These seemingly contradictory strands, compulsory and voluntary, collective and individualistic, are woven together to form a strong braid.
(…)
So much for the big evolutionary picture that was beyond Tocqueville’s imagination. How does it bear upon the urgent questions of our day, such as the incendiary speech of a US president and the decision of major tech companies to deny him a forum? Let’s shrink these problems down to see what they look like at the scale of a small group. As we have seen, there is a necessity for everyone to have a say in matters of collective importance. This is the necessity that is recognized by the First Amendment of the US Constitution. There is also the necessity to suppress bullying and other behaviors that can disrupt the common good. It all depends on the context. In small and well-regulated human groups, it is relatively easy to recognize the context and apply the appropriate rules.
Not only was this true for small groups in the distant past and the small-scale societies of today, but examples abound in modern WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic) societies (6). Consider the norms of scholarship and science, where adhering to the facts of the matter is a cardinal virtue. The formation and testing of alternative hypotheses is a form of unrestricted free speech, failure to cite or misrepresenting relevant material is rigorously policed, and willfully falsifying data results in immediate exclusion. These norms are as strong as those of the strongest religions. Similar examples could be cited for other modern contexts where truth-telling is important, such as responsible journalism and judicial procedures. When witnesses at a trial swear to “tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth…” they legally bind themselves to that commitment.
(…)
The second major factor is that evolutionary theory, which was beyond the imagination of Tocqueville, is still a new perspective in discussions of social theory, economics and law. The title of my book This View of Life: Completing the Darwinian Revolution, signifies that the conceptual unification that has taken place in the biological sciences (and of course continues), is only now taking place in the human-related sciences. In my long career, I have observed that the “evolutionizing” of human-related disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, religion, economics, business, and law takes place at different rates based on idiosyncratic factors.
Economics and business are late bloomers and law even more so. One of the few legal scholars who thinks about free speech and the Internet from an evolutionary perspective is Julie Seaman, Associate Professor at Emory University’s School of Law. An open-access article that we coauthored titled #FreeSpeech makes a start at evolutionizing the concept of free speech, in general, and in the Internet Age. This conversation needs to expand and be put into action rapidly, to keep pace with the rate of cultural evolution in the Internet Age. Otherwise, only social dysfunction can result.”
***
#FreeSpeech
Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2017
Emory Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-439
30 Pages
Posted: 14 Apr 2017
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2951909
Julie Seaman
Emory University School of Law
David Wilson
Binghamton University
Date Written: April 12, 2017
Abstract
It has become commonplace to note that courts have struggled with the challenge of applying analog legal concepts to digital spaces, and nowhere is this truer than in the context of the First Amendment. Here, we focus on a very specific aspect of the Internet and social media revolution – the impact on human behavior of this distinct medium of communication – to consider whether the online context of a communication can be expected to affect the behavior either of the speaker or the audience in ways that might be relevant to First Amendment theory and doctrine.
With the emergence of the field of cyberpsychology over the past decade, the complex universe of the online social brain has begun to reveal itself. While much of this space is thus far only roughly mapped and much else is yet to be discovered, there are a number of preliminary findings that have implications for thinking about freedom of speech on the Internet. The nature and effects of disinhibition online, the effect of online social communication on memory and belief about facts and events in the physical world, and the drivers of antisocial behaviors such as flaming, shaming, and trolling – to name just a few – are all fertile ground for analysis and further research as they relate to First Amendment theory, doctrine, and values.
This initial foray into the treacherous terrain at the crossroads of the First Amendment, social media, and human behavior also draws on the evolutionary science of group dynamics and cooperation, which has much to say about how individuals behave within groups, how groups behave with respect to other groups, and the features that can make some groups successful, constructive, egalitarian, and prosocial while others are destructive, hierarchical, violent, and antisocial. It explores the implications of these ideas as they relate to groups that operate in cyberspace.
Keywords: First Amendment, Cyberspeech, Cyberpsychology, Internet Speech”
“This is your brain on political arguments
Debating is cognitively taxing but also important for the health of a democracy—provided it’s face-to-face.
DEREK BERES
18 January, 2021
https://bigthink.com/mind-brain/your-brain-on-arguing
– New research at Yale identifies the brain regions that are affected when you’re in disagreeable conversations.
– Talking with someone you agree with harmonizes brain regions and is less energetically taxing.
– The research involves face-to-face dialogues, not conversations on social media.
You probably know the feeling: a rush of heat that assaults your entire body; your fingertips and forehead suffering fiery consequences of conflict; restrictions around your chest and throat; quickened breath, as if your lungs can no longer draw in the required oxygen; ears on alert, biding time for a break in your opponent’s rhetoric to let loose the torrent of thoughts crowding your brain.
Of course, not everyone is an opponent. You likely know the opposite as well: the cool excitement of agreeableness, when the words in your head are returned to you from another being as in a mirror; unconscious head shaking as your sense of righteousness is validated; the warm exuberance of easy dialogue with a fellow tribe member.
In a digital age in which physical contact seems foreign and long past, we might have forgotten what it’s like to agree—or debate—with someone in person. Pandemics are temporary, while societies are—well, nothing is forever, but we’ve outlived diseases before. According to new research from Yale University, published in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, disagreeing with someone takes up a lot of brain real estate, while finding a compatriot is a much less cognitively taxing endeavor.
(…)
Senior author Joy Hirsch notes that our brain is essentially a social processing network. The evolutionary success of humans is thanks to our ability to coordinate. Dissonance is exhausting. Overall, she says, “it just takes a lot more brain real estate to disagree than to agree,” comparing arguments to a symphony orchestra playing different music.
As the team notes, language, visual, and social systems are all dynamically intertwined inside of our brain. For most of history, yelling at one another in comment sections was impossible. Arguments had to occur the old-fashioned way: while staring at the source of your discontent.
(…)
Leading us to an interesting question: do the same brain regions fire when you’re screaming with your fingers on your Facebook feed? Given the lack of visual feedback from the person on the other side of the argument, likely not—as it is unlikely that many people would argue in the same manner when face-to-face with a person on the other side of a debate. We are generally more civil in real life than on a screen.”
***
“Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
13 January 2021
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2020.606397
Interpersonal Agreement and Disagreement During Face-to-Face Dialogue: An fNIRS Investigation
Joy Hirsch 1,2,3,4,5*, Mark Tiede 1,4, Xian Zhang 1, J. Adam Noah 1, Alexandre Salama-Manteau 1 and Maurice Biriotti 6
1 Brain Function Laboratory, Department of Psychiatry, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, CT, United States
2 Department of Neuroscience, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, CT, United States
3 Department of Comparative Medicine, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, CT, United States
4 Haskins Laboratories, New Haven, CT, United States
5 Department of Medical Physics and Biomedical Engineering, University College London, London, United Kingdom
6 Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University College London, London, United Kingdom
Although the neural systems that underlie spoken language are well-known, how they adapt to evolving social cues during natural conversations remains an unanswered question. In this work we investigate the neural correlates of face-to-face conversations between two individuals using functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) and acoustical analyses of concurrent audio recordings. Nineteen pairs of healthy adults engaged in live discussions on two controversial topics where their opinions were either in agreement or disagreement. Participants were matched according to their a priori opinions on these topics as assessed by questionnaire. Acoustic measures of the recorded speech including the fundamental frequency range, median fundamental frequency, syllable rate, and acoustic energy were elevated during disagreement relative to agreement. Consistent with both the a priori opinion ratings and the acoustic findings, neural activity associated with long-range functional networks, rather than the canonical language areas, was also differentiated by the two conditions. Specifically, the frontoparietal system including bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, left supramarginal gyrus, angular gyrus, and superior temporal gyrus showed increased activity while talking during disagreement. In contrast, talking during agreement was characterized by increased activity in a social and attention network including right supramarginal gyrus, bilateral frontal eye-fields, and left frontopolar regions. Further, these social and visual attention networks were more synchronous across brains during agreement than disagreement. Rather than localized modulation of the canonical language system, these findings are most consistent with a model of distributed and adaptive language-related processes including cross-brain neural coupling that serves dynamic verbal exchanges.”
“#417 Rick Shenkman – Political Animals: How Our Stone-Age Brain Gets in the Way of Smart Politics
14 de jan. de 2021
The Dissenter
RECORDED ON NOVEMBER 9th 2020.
Rick Shenkman is the founder of George Washington University’s History News Network, the website that features leading historians’ perspectives on current events. He is a New York Times best-selling author of seven history books. His latest book is Political Animals: How Our Stone-Age Brain Gets in the Way of Smart Politics. Mr. Shenkman is an Emmy award-winning investigative reporter and the former managing editor of KIRO-TV, the CBS affiliate in Seattle. In 1997 he was the host, writer and producer of a prime-time series for The Learning Channel inspired by his books on myths. In 2008 he was elected a Fellow of the Society of American Historians. He gives lectures at colleges around the country on several topics, including American myths and presidential politics.
In this episode, we talk about Political Animals. We go through topics like evolutionary mismatch; how good we really are at reading politicians, and if it is easy for them to lie to us; self-deception in politics; the role the media play in politics; the problem with presenting information in the form of stories; empathizing with strangers in modern large-scale societies; relying on gut feelings; and solutions to current political problems.
Time Links:
00:48 Political evolutionary mismatch
07:32 Can people know politicians well enough?
20:40 Is it easy for politicians to sell us lies?
25:26 Self-deception
30:12 The media, and presenting information in the form of stories
38:44 Can we empathize with people that are not part of our group?
44:07 Should we rely on our gut feelings?
53:11 Solutions to these problems
1:04:27 Follow Rick’s work!”
“Why a Universal Society Is Unattainable
Our minds evolved in an Us-vs-Them universe of our own making.
JANUARY 13, 2021
BY MARK W. MOFFETT
Mark W. Moffett, Ph.D., is the author of The Human Swarm: How Our Societies Arise, Thrive, & Fall, from which this essay is adapted. He has a Lowell Thomas medal from the Explorers Club for his work in over 100 countries on the questions about the structure of rainforests, social organization in ants, and the stability of societies across different species.
https://nautil.us/issue/95/escape/why-a-universal-society-is-unattainable
(…)
In the 2016 vote, the majority of British people stubbornly chose for their country to be on its own and not part of a more encompassing group of societies. The vote appeared to run against the broader trend of European nations loosening their boundaries in acknowledgement of an identity that outweighs, or erases, the importance of the societies themselves. With the number of societies in general declining century after century,1 we might take seriously the assertion that the internationalization of culture (think Star Wars, tequila, Mercedes-Benz) and connections (with Twitter linking people from Aa, Estonia, to Zu, Afghanistan) are a harbinger of a Berlin Wall-type border collapse, making, as the British sociologist Morris Ginsberg once put it, “The unification of mankind … one of the clearest trends in human history.”2
Whatever the ultimate relationship of Great Britain and Europe may be, the current breakup underscores how deeply national identity runs through human psychology. Both psychological literature and anthropological research on societies ranging from the ethnolinguistic groups of hunter-gatherers to tribes, chiefdoms, and states (less formally, “nations”),3 reveal that a universal society is unattainable. Populations across the globe today may devour Starbucks, KFC, and Coca-Cola. They may enjoy Italian opera, French couture, and Persian carpets. But no matter how many exotic influences each absorbs or what foreign connections they make, nations don’t just fade away. They retain their citizens’ fierce devotion.4 Societies have always traded, gifted, or taken what they want from the outer world to claim as their own, and grown all the stronger for doing so. While the erasure of borders may be laudable, nothing we know about the workings of the human mind suggests it is a realistic vision.
(…)
A failure of alliances to supersede people’s affiliation to their society holds true universally. Intergovernmental organizations like the European Union and the United Nations don’t earn our primary emotional commitment because they lack ingredients that make them real for the members. The EU may be the most ambitious attempt at societal integration conceived, yet few members see the EU as an entity worthy of their loyalty the way they do their countries, and for several reasons.
(…)
To top all that off, the EU offers no grand foundation story, no venerable symbols or traditions, and there’s little sense anyone would fight and die for Europe as they might for their nation.7
(…)
Analysis of the 2016 Brexit vote shows that those who most strongly think of themselves as English went against staying with the EU. Voters saw what was intended foremost to be an economic and peacekeeping tool as a threat to their identity.9 The fact is the consequences of Brexit will be mostly commercial, setting into action a myriad of obstacles to trade.10
(…)
One possible means of attaining that unity might be to shift people’s perception of who’s an outsider. It was a point Ronald Reagan liked to make. “I occasionally think how quickly our differences worldwide would vanish if we were facing an alien threat from outside this world,” he remarked in an address to the UN. Indeed, science-fiction tales like The War of the Worlds depict humankind acting as one against a common enemy.
Yet even then our societies would endure the space aliens. The arrival of Martians wouldn’t make nations irrelevant any more than Europeans arriving in Australia caused the Aborigines to drop what had been several hundred clear-cut tribal groups (actually, many Aborigines first guessed that the Europeans were otherworldly, i.e., ghosts16). That would be so regardless of how much the aliens shattered the beliefs people held about their own societies, whose beloved differences would look trivial by comparison to those with the Little Green Men. Cosmopolitanism, the conviction that the diverse people of our planet will come to feel a primary connection to the human race (the term means “citizen of the cosmos”),17 is a pipe dream.
(…)
The human reliance on particular traits, or “markers,” to identify with our societies, ethnicities, and other groups may trace back far into the human past, but what comes naturally isn’t always desirable. Fortunately, our intelligence gives us some prospect of breaking free from our biology and history. When changes concern the matter of how we mark off our identities, though, any alteration would be extremely arduous and require more than education. While casting off ethnic and societal markers may sound good at first blush, the move would undoubtedly mean the loss of much of what humans cherish. Our markers are two-edged swords, causing us to discount those who differ from us, yet at the same time imparting an esprit de corps with complete strangers who fit our expectations, as when we take delight in conversing with a fellow American when traveling overseas.
To abandon our differences would strike against timeless yearnings. People care about their memberships and few would want to give them up. Nor could we simply dispose of them. Research in psychology shows that our responses to the most entrenched of our social groups, and the characteristics that define them, take place faster than the blink of an eye, and are involuntary.18 No doubt if a mass hypnotist caused us to forget our current differences, we would scramble to discover or invent new differences to hold dear.
(…)
The mind evolved in an Us-vs-Them universe of our own making. The societies coming out of this psychological firmament have always been points of reference that give people a secure sense of meaning and validation.
(…)
Social marginalization has been a motivator stronger than religious fanaticism, explaining why many terrorists originally took to extremism only after being excluded from the cultural mainstream. For the socially dispossessed, radical views fill a void.21 Organized crime groups likewise commandeer some of the properties that give a society its vitality by providing social pariahs with common goals and a sense of pride and belonging.
(…)
Being in a society (indeed, in multiple societies) is a more indispensable and ancient quality of our species than faith or matrimony, having been the way of things from before we were human.”
“James C. Scott : l’expansion de l’Etat a-t-elle standardisé le monde ?
France Culture
LA GRANDE TABLE IDÉES par Olivia Gesbert
L’anthropologue James C. Scott poursuit sa réflexion sur les Etats modernes et la relation qu’ils entretiennent avec les communautés qu’ils gouvernent dans un livre de 1998 enfin traduit en France sous le titre “L’oeil de l’Etat” (La Découverte). Il est notre invité aujourd’hui.
On le connaît pour Homo domesticus. Une histoire profonde des premiers Etats (La Découverte, 2019), un ouvrage explorant les conditions d’émergence de l’Etat. James C. Scott est professeur émérite de science politique et d’anthropologie à l’université de Yale. Figure majeure de l’anthropologie anarchiste, il se penche sur les rapports de domination et les stratégies des populations rurales ou montagnardes pour échapper au pouvoir de l’Etat.
Paraît en français L’œil de l’État. Moderniser, uniformiser, détruire (traduit de l’anglais par Olivier Ruchet) à La Découverte. Publié en 1998 sous le titre Seeing Like A State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, il est à l’époque reconnu par The New Yorker et le Sunday New York Times.
“Political Extremism in the US: A New Study
Jordan Moss
Jordan Moss has a research focus on personality and political attitudes. He is interested in individual differences, with particular interest in moral psychology.
https://areomagazine.com/2020/10/26/political-extremism-in-the-us-a-new-study/
***
Political correctness and the alt-right: The development of extreme political attitudes
Jordan T. Moss ,
Peter J. O’Connor
PLOS ONE 15(10): e0239259
Published: October 7, 2020
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0239259
***
This study utilised a nationally representative sample to investigate the cultural divide on the political left and right. We found evidence of an ideological divide on both sides, with generational changes in social media and parenting styles contributing to an increase in authoritarian social attitudes. Traditional liberal attitudes were shown to be distinct from authoritarian political correctness, and traditional conservatism was shown to be distinct from the white identitarian attitudes of the alt-right. Adherents to classical political attitudes were distinguished from their authoritarian counterparts by differences in personality traits, upbringing, social media use and moral perspectives. This study provides evidence of a cultural divide, and reports that extreme political attitudes represent a significant minority of attitudes in the United States.
In recent years, US politics has been defined by polarization. Voters are more politically divided and partisan antipathy is deeper now than at any time in the last twenty years. As the major parties in the US separate, ideological fragmentation can be seen on both sides of the aisle, with political correctness (PC) on the regressive left and white identitarian attitudes on the alt-right. Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt have hypothesized that these movements reflect generational changes in parenting styles, resilience and social media use. However, no academic research has directly assessed these claims. To fill this gap, Peter O’Connor and I investigated the psychological predictors of these extreme political attitudes.
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What We Found: The Prevalence of the Extremes
Unsurprisingly, the largest portion (30.9%) of Americans identified as politically moderate, and were either indifferent to, disagreed or strongly disagreed with the extreme left and right. However, a significant minority identified with the extremes. On the left, 8.2% of participants held extreme PCL attitudes, whereas 6.1% held extreme PCA attitudes. On the right, 14.1% of white participants agreed or strongly agreed with the attitudes typical of the alt-right.
The Predictors of Extremism: The Effect of Social Media
The typical narrative explaining the increase in political polarization centers on the rise of social media. When online, people are more likely to engage with people who hold similar views to them and disengage from those who hold different opinions. This creates echo chambers that serve to reinforce one’s certainty in one’s attitudes, while allowing one to disregard the moral claims of others. We found that the effect of social media was different for the extreme left and right. While social media predicted both liberal and authoritarian political correctness, it did not predict white identitarian attitudes. This makes sense, as previous research has found a disproportionate amount of leftist content and number of liberal users on sites such as Facebook (most participants reported Facebook as their primary social media site).
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Over-Protective Parenting and Low Resilience
As Lukianoff and Haidt have argued, the increase in political correctness could be, in part, attributed to generational changes in child rearing. More parents are acting on behalf of their children in difficult situations and are demanding an emotionally safe environment in school (e.g. one that includes the awarding of participation trophies). This means that younger generations are growing up in a more emotionally accommodating world than their parents did. Children are being taught that an external body is watching out for their welfare and is able to remove any obstacle that is too overwhelming. Without the opportunity to explore the world independently, children do not develop the resilience necessary to deal with problems on their own. According to Lukianoff and Haidt, these children grow into young adults who are less capable of dealing with adversity and are more likely to rely on an external authority to resolve their problems.
This study utilised a nationally representative sample to investigate the cultural divide on the political left and right. We found evidence of an ideological divide on both sides, with generational changes in social media and parenting styles contributing to an increase in authoritarian social attitudes. Traditional liberal attitudes were shown to be distinct from authoritarian political correctness, and traditional conservatism was shown to be distinct from the white identitarian attitudes of the alt-right. Adherents to classical political attitudes were distinguished from their authoritarian counterparts by differences in personality traits, upbringing, social media use and moral perspectives. This study provides evidence of a cultural divide, and reports that extreme political attitudes represent a significant minority of attitudes in the United States.
In recent years, US politics has been defined by polarization. Voters are more politically divided and partisan antipathy is deeper now than at any time in the last twenty years. As the major parties in the US separate, ideological fragmentation can be seen on both sides of the aisle, with political correctness (PC) on the regressive left and white identitarian attitudes on the alt-right. Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt have hypothesized that these movements reflect generational changes in parenting styles, resilience and social media use. However, no academic research has directly assessed these claims. To fill this gap, Peter O’Connor and I investigated the psychological predictors of these extreme political attitudes.
A quota-based sample of 512 American participants was studied. The subjects were representative of the demography of the United States in terms of age, ethnicity, gender, employment status and education level. Participants responded to questionnaires that measure personality traits, black-and-white moral thinking, resilience, perceptions of the parenting they received as children and social media use. Three sets of political attitudes were also assessed: political correctness-liberalism, political correctness-authoritarianism and white identitarianism.
Liberal and authoritarian political correctness are the two main variants of political correctness. Liberal proponents of political correctness are primarily concerned with individual welfare and represent the classically liberal effort to promote socially disadvantaged groups. To identify this group, we asked participants to assess statements like “Retail stores should avoid using the word ‘Christmas’ in their November and December advertising campaigns.”
Authoritarian proponents of political correctness focus on purity and safety and endorse the efforts of cancel culture to censor emotionally upsetting content. To assess authoritarian political correctness, we asked participants to rate their levels of agreement with statements such as “when a charge of sexual assault is brought forth, the alleged perpetrator should have to prove his or her innocence.” While both liberal and authoritarian proponents of political correctness protest the use of non-inclusive speech, authoritarians show a greater tendency toward violent, immediate and autocratic methods.
White identitarianism represent the racialist attitudes typical of the apparently (see below) far-right subculture known as the alt-right. To assess these attitudes, participants were asked to respond to statements like “race is the foundation of identity” and “whites are being forgotten and replaced by minorities in this country.”
What We Found: The Prevalence of the Extremes
Unsurprisingly, the largest portion (30.9%) of Americans identified as politically moderate, and were either indifferent to, disagreed or strongly disagreed with the extreme left and right. However, a significant minority identified with the extremes. On the left, 8.2% of participants held extreme PCL attitudes, whereas 6.1% held extreme PCA attitudes. On the right, 14.1% of white participants agreed or strongly agreed with the attitudes typical of the alt-right.
The Predictors of Extremism: The Effect of Social Media
The typical narrative explaining the increase in political polarization centers on the rise of social media. When online, people are more likely to engage with people who hold similar views to them and disengage from those who hold different opinions. This creates echo chambers that serve to reinforce one’s certainty in one’s attitudes, while allowing one to disregard the moral claims of others. We found that the effect of social media was different for the extreme left and right. While social media predicted both liberal and authoritarian political correctness, it did not predict white identitarian attitudes. This makes sense, as previous research has found a disproportionate amount of leftist content and number of liberal users on sites such as Facebook (most participants reported Facebook as their primary social media site). However, as this study did not look into the ways in which different social media sites affect the development of extreme political attitudes, we cannot speak to the effect of individual online platforms (Facebook vs. Twitter vs. Reddit, etc).
Over-Protective Parenting and Low Resilience
As Lukianoff and Haidt have argued, the increase in political correctness could be, in part, attributed to generational changes in child rearing. More parents are acting on behalf of their children in difficult situations and are demanding an emotionally safe environment in school (e.g. one that includes the awarding of participation trophies). This means that younger generations are growing up in a more emotionally accommodating world than their parents did. Children are being taught that an external body is watching out for their welfare and is able to remove any obstacle that is too overwhelming. Without the opportunity to explore the world independently, children do not develop the resilience necessary to deal with problems on their own. According to Lukianoff and Haidt, these children grow into young adults who are less capable of dealing with adversity and are more likely to rely on an external authority to resolve their problems.
In accordance with this hypothesis, the study found evidence that generational changes in parenting styles have contributed to extreme left attitudes. Younger participants reported having more overprotective parents and lower levels of resilience, and both these factors were shown to contribute to authoritarian political correctness. That is, the people who are calling for the shutdown of events that host speakers with whom they disagree are more likely to have been coddled and over-protected as children and are now less able to bounce back after facing hardship. It is important to note that these factors did not predict liberal political correctness, which shows a clear distinction in the emotionality of people from these two subgroups.
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Why Does This Matter?
The first thing that we should take away from this study is that these movements are real. While previous political commentary has largely relied on anecdotes, this study provides scientific basis for the argument that movements promoting cancel culture and white identitarianism have taken hold of political discourse. This means that—despite leftist claims that the PC police are a product of the conservative imagination—cancel culture is a real influence on today’s politics. Also, despite the right’s claim that alarm at growing racialism in the US is the result of paranoia, white identitarians (although seemingly quiet) do represent a small part of the American political scene.
Second, this study supports the hypothesis of Lukianoff and Haidt that generational changes have contributed to the movement towards the far-left. According to their book The Coddling of the American Mind, increased adult intervention protects children in the short-term but has long-term developmental consequences. Overprotective parenting creates individuals who have not developed the resilience to deal with the problems that we all face in life. As these children grow into young adults of voting age, they seek the same emotionally accommodating interventions that they received from their parents, in the form of the government. In contemporary politics, we can see this in adherence to cancel culture.”
“The Science of America’s Dueling Political Narratives
Elections aren’t won on the basis of policies; they’re won on the basis of the stories each side tells about itself and its values
By Laura Akers
Laura Akers, Ph.D. is a research psychologist at the Oregon Research Institute. Follow her work at http://meta-narrator.com or on Twitter @meta_narrator.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-science-of-americas-dueling-political-narratives/
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The science of metanarratives and how we respond to them is still in its infancy. Our research team, headed by psychologist Gerard Saucier, has uncovered the metanarratives typical of terrorists and genocidal leaders worldwide. More broadly, my own work seeks to understand how the structure and features of metanarratives can elicit emotional responses, and how social factors influence public reactions.
Emotions arise when we make comparisons relevant to our own needs and desires. We contrast our present circumstances with the future, the past and alternative versions of today. Improvements make us happy and inspire us; losses sadden or frustrate us. If we can blame someone else for our loss, we may become angry with them. And if we’re faced with threats, our fear can motivate action. As with fiction, we can categorize metanarratives by their emotional “genres,” such as progress (pride, optimism) or looming catastrophe (fear).
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As cognitive scientists George Lakoff and Drew Westen remind us, it’s emotion that wins elections.
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The public doesn’t accept every metanarrative it’s offered. We tend to be loyal to the cultural beliefs favored by our social circles and encouraged by our leaders. Even then, some voters stay open to alternatives, if there’s enough dissonance between the party line and their own experiences.”
What is HBES Doing About the WEIRD Problem?
October 3, 2020/in Newsletter
By HBES Executive Council Members, Chris von Rueden & Coren Apicella
Evolution and Human Behavior (EHB) just released its September issue, which is devoted to highlighting ongoing research in the evolutionary social sciences that expands beyond WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) populations. This special issue, titled “Beyond WEIRD, a decade later: Population diversity in the evolutionary study of human behavior,” was edited by Coren Apicella, Ara Norenzayan, and Joseph Henrich and features articles on topics including evolutionary medicine, cooperation, leadership, morality, and developmental psychology.
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Now, authors who submit to the journal are required to fully describe their samples. For instance, authors are now asked to specify the geographic location from which their sample was drawn, how their data was collected (online or in-person), and any theoretically-relevant characteristics pertinent to the research study, such as religion affiliation, race/ethnicity, and gender identity (inclusive of non-binary options). And importantly, authors must also specify the source of the sample in their Abstract. Manuscripts that do not adequately describe samples will be returned to authors for revision prior to consideration.
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The September EHB issue, “Beyond WEIRD, A Decade Later: Population Diversity in the Evolutionary Study of Human Behavior,” offers some criticisms, but its contributors are also optimistic about the future of evolutionary social science. We agree that the methods and theory will only get better, and that is in part because of the disciplinary diversity of our community. In particular, the dialogue between anthropologists and psychologists has been, and we hope will continue to be, an engine at the heart of the creativity and productivity of HBES.
“Neuropolítica: los secretos detrás del debate político entre Donald Trump y Joe Biden
Los candidatos utilizaron diversas estrategias para llamar la atención del espectador y votante saliendo de los esquemas y patrones de lo que el cerebro espera encontrar en un evento de estas características. Muchas de estos factores de persuasión emocional funcionan de forma inconsciente como el storytelling o el miedo.
Por: Andrés Fredericksen
Twitter: @fredericksen_a
DEA del programa de doctorado en Ciencias Políticas y Sociología por la U. Pontificia de Salamanca, España
Máster en neurociencias cognitivas aplicadas a la empresa por la U. Rey Juan Carlos de Madrid, España.
Las investigaciones en neurociencias cognitivas y su aplicación a la política, neuropolítica argumentan que la mayor parte de nuestras decisiones son más emocionales que racionales. Estos descubrimientos hacen que las estrategias comunicativas se replanteen entre los líderes políticos, ya que develan la importancia de las emociones en el proceso de toma de decisiones electorales, al tiempo de comprender que estructuras mentales y emocionales están involucradas en la persuasión para lograr el voto.
El neurocientifico Antonio Damasio argumenta que las emociones son responsables de nuestra toma de decisiones, ya que son capaces de alterar nuestro estado de atención y afectan nuestra conducta, condicionan los recuerdos y las experiencias generando una serie de influencias innatas – muchas veces inconsciente- en los individuos que afectan a la forma de expresarse y de tomar decisiones.
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“Los americanos votan en relación a sus marcos mentales y que los republicanos han tenido éxito electoral ya que han enlazado su discurso al sistema de conceptos y valores de la sociedad Americana, y han logrado utilizar un lenguaje eficaz que penetre en las emociones del electorado y que se alinee a sus marcos mentales”, expresa George Lakoff profesor de ciencia cognitiva y lingüística de la Universidad de California, Berkeley, en su libro “The Political Mind”.
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Joe Biden llegó a llamar al actual presidente de Estados Unidos de “payaso” para llamar la atención del espectador, al tiempo de decirle “racista”, concepto recurrente entre los detractores de Trump, especialmente después del asesinato de un hombre negro George Floyd a manos de la policía y por los ataques contra la inmigración mexicana y centroamericana para atraer votos en la frontera.
A su vez Donald Trump sacó a relucir el consumo de cocaína de del hijo de Joe Biden agudizando la tensión en el debate.
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Una palabra negativa o insultante activa la amígdala, estructura del cerebro vinculada a las alertas. En el debate muchas veces predominó el caos, expresiones ofensivas y los golpes bajos, se centró en contarnos pequeñas historias, como lo haría de igual forma una serie, “culebrón” o una película.
Desde la neuropolítica se argumenta que al cerebro le gusta escuchar historias, ya que hacen emocionar, al tiempo de provocar cambios químicos en el cerebro. El storytelling es el arte de contar historias que impacten a la audiencia y al elector, se busca generar emociones que revivan momentos del pasado, ya sea propio o de una nación o pueblo, impulsando una conexión e identificación con el elector.
“Non-partisan brains differ from those of partisans
Non-partisans are real, and their lack of partisanship has a cognitive element.
21 August, 2020
https://bigthink.com/mind-brain/non-partisan-brain
A new study suggests that the brains of non-partisans function differently than those of partisans.
Blood flow to regions associated with problem solving differed between the two groups.
The findings may lead to further research in how differences in brain activity affect personality.
Despite the repeated claims of those without party affiliations, the belief that non-partisans don’t actually exist is widespread. Proponents of this stance argue that those who claim to be non-partisans are merely partisans who don’t want to be outed.
A new study offers a strong counterpoint to these commentators; it suggests that the brains of non-partisans function differently than the brains of partisans.
Some people just really don’t want to join political clubs. Go figure.
The study, published in The Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties as “Neural Nonpartisans,” looked at blood flow in the brains of partisans and non-partisans as they played a betting game. The test subjects, all of which were from San Diego County, had their brains scanned as they decided between options with guaranteed payoffs or ones with the chance to lose or gain money. The results were later compared to their voter registrations to confirm their partisanship or lack thereof.
The brain scans demonstrated that blood flow to the right medial temporal pole, orbitofrontal/medial prefrontal cortex, and right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex differs between partisans and non-partisans as they made decisions in the previously mentioned game. These regions are associated with socially relevant memory, decision making, and goal-related responses. Previous studies have also shown them to be essential for social connections.
This demonstrates that the brains of non-partisans approach non-political problems differently than the brains of partisans. Future studies may go further, and see if other brain functions differ between the two groups.
The study is not without limitations; there were a mere 110 test subjects overall. However, given the general lack of research on non-partisans, the study is still an excellent starting point for further research.
What does this mean for politics?
Lead author Dr. Darren Schreiber laid out his interpretation of the data and offered takeaways:
“There is skepticism about the existence of non-partisan voters, that they are just people who don’t want to state their preferences. But we have shown their brain activity is different, even aside from politics. We think this has important implications for political campaigning – non-partisans need to be considered a third voter group. In the USA 40 percent of people are thought to be non-partisan voters. Previous research shows negative campaigning deters them from voting. This exploratory study suggests US politicians need to treat swing voters differently, and positive campaigning may be important in winning their support. While heated rhetoric may appeal to a party’s base, it can drive non-partisans away from politics all together.”
He references a variety of studies on the effects of negative campaigning. It is widely agreed that it drives down turnout.
A variety of studies suggest that differences in political opinion relate to the differences in the brain. While these studies can’t tell us how to solve our various political problems, they can offer us ways to help bridge the gap. People who don’t leap at the opportunity to join political clubs must be interreacted with differently than those who do to encourage their involvement. While this may come as a shock to seasoned political junkies, it may also come with benefits to our political discourse.”
“Our Big Fight Over Nothing: The Political Spectrum Does Not Exist
Hyrum Lewis
Hyrum Lewis is a professor of history at Brigham Young University-Idaho and has held visiting positions at Stanford University and Skidmore College. He has previously published books and articles on the history of ideology and the philosophy of religion.
June 12, 2020
https://heterodoxacademy.org/social-science-political-spectrum/?utm_source=feedly&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=social-science-political-spectrum
One of the real tragedies of contemporary politics is that our most bitter disagreements are about something that doesn’t even exist—the political spectrum. Left and right are entirely tribal designations and have no unifying philosophy or principle behind them that can be represented on a unidimensional spectrum.
This may sound like an absurd claim, but before rejecting out of hand, consider that the political spectrum rests on an essentialist theory of ideology that has been soundly falsified. The essentialist theory says that, although it may seem that there are many distinct political issues in politics, there is actually just one big issue—an underlying essence that ties them all together (e.g., change vs. preservation, equality vs. freedom, order vs. liberty, realism vs. idealism, etc.). If politics is unidimensional (about one essential issue), then a unidimensional political spectrum is adequate to represent politics.
An alternative to this essentialist theory is the “social theory” of ideology, which says that distinct political positions correlate because they are bound by a unifying tribe. If the right-wing team is currently in favor of tax cuts and opposed to abortion, then those who identify with that team will adopt those positions as a matter of social conformity, not because both are expressions of some underlying principle. If the social theory is correct, the political spectrum is of little use because there is no single essence; instead there are many unrelated political issues and therefore many political dimensions.
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I understand why so many of us want to believe in the political spectrum—it makes politics simple and gives us the illusion that our party’s beliefs have an underlying (and righteous) philosophical coherence—but it’s time to face up to the facts. “Right-wing” and “left-wing” are little more than tribal designations. Shedding our jerseys might help us become more rational, more humble, less tribal, and ultimately, more open-minded when it comes to public issues.”
“Estudo mostra que pessoas com viés político são mais suscetíveis a fake news
05/07/2020 • 07:00
Suzana Correa
Um estudo brasileiro inédito que será publicado no Journal of American Politics, a partir de experimento realizado nas eleições presidenciais de 2018, pode acabar com o mito de que quem acredita em fake news é a “tia do zap”. Os pesquisadores mostram que quem mais confia em boato falso são os que já têm time definido no jogo político. E o desejo de eleitores de concluir aquilo que é sugerido por suas filiações partidárias reduz a eficácia da checagem de informações.
— Escolaridade, nível intelectual, sexo e idade não têm relação com o quanto se acredita em fake news. Mais que mexer com eleitor médio, elas reforçam crenças de quem já tem posição política e intensificam preconceitos, opiniões e valores — diz Felipe Nunes, um dos autores da pesquisa, professor da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) e diretor da consultoria Quaest.
O experimento indica que expor os eleitores a esclarecimentos da própria vítima do falso rumor não funciona. Apresentar a checagem de veículo de grande porte é mais eficaz. O estudo, chamado “Raciocínio motivado sem partidarismo? Fake news nas eleições brasileiras de 2018”, mostrou petistas e anti-petistas como os mais suscetíveis a acreditarem em fake news sobre o PT, negativas ou positivas.
A boa notícia é que apenas cerca de 30% dos entrevistados no experimento brasileiro acreditavam nas fake news. A proporção é menor do que os 43% observados em estudos nos Estados Unidos e outros países. Os pesquisadores acreditam que a identificação partidária no Brasil, considerada fraca e instável, pode contribuir para limitar a disseminação de fake news no país.
— Esse é o principal efeito que produzem numa eleição. É também um mecanismo de reforço da coesão e de mobilização daquele próprio grupo — diz Nunes.
O estudo confirma os impactos do já conhecido “viés de confirmação”, segundo o qual interpretamos ou pesquisamos informações para confirmar crenças e hipóteses que já temos. O fenômeno é investigado pela psicologia social e ciência política desde 1970, mas voltou à moda com o surgimento das redes sociais e fake news.
É este viés que forma nas redes o que os estudiosos chamam de “bolhas” ou “câmaras de eco” partidárias: ao seguir e curtir apenas conteúdo que confirma suas preferências políticas ou morais, o usuário de redes sociais como Facebook ou Twitter “treina”, involuntariamente, os algoritmos da rede a mostrarem cada vez mais informações que corroboram suas crenças.
Nestes ambientes, as fake news são mais aceitas como verdade e compartilhadas, porque confirmam a visão positiva sobre o partido do usuário — ou negativa sobre aquele que odeia — e que se torna predominante ali.
— O experimento mostra que o senso comum de que os menos escolarizados seriam os mais propensos a serem afetados por fake news é mentira. O que realmente afeta é a posição política da pessoa e isso só acontece porque hoje quase ninguém usa informação para atualizar o que sabe, mas para confirmar o que já acredita — conclui Nunes.”